# CHART A

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From: Div13) (FBI) Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 12:26 PM	
To: HARRINGTON, T.J. (Div13) (FBI)  Cc: BATTLE, FRANKIE (Niv13) (FBI) (Div13) (FBI) (Div14) (FBI) (Div14) (FBI) (Div14) (FBI) (D	
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Bottom line is FBI personnel have not been involved in any methods of interrogation that deviate from our policy. The specific guidance we have given has always been no Miranda, otherwise, follow FBI/DOJ policy just as you would in your field office. Use common sense. Utilize our methods that are proven (Reed school, etc).	16 -1,2 17c -1,
If you would like to call me to discuss this on the telephone I can be reached at b2 -1	.7c -1,:

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From: To:		b6 -1	
Date: Subject	Mon, Sep 30, 2002 7 56 PM Re Update	b7C -1	
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From: Sent: To:	Monday, May 10, 2 HARRINGTON, T.	J. (ON13) (FBI)	b7a -2 • I			
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From: HARRINGTON, T.J. (DIV13) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 9:21 AM
To: (DIV13) (FBI)
Subject: RE: pls confirm

#### SENSITIVÉ BUT UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD

We have this information, now we are trying to go beyond, did we ever put into writing, in an EC, memo, note or briefing paper to our personnel our position to not be part of the SERE techniques that we were pursuing our traditional methods of building trust and a relationship with subjects. Tom

From: (Div13) (FBI)

Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 10:52 AM

To: HARRINGTON, T'J. (Div13) (FBI)

CC: (Div13) (FBI); BATTLE, FRANKIE (DIv13) (FBI); BOWMAN, MARION E.

(Div19) (FBI)

Subject: RE: pls confirm

### SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD

BAU at the request of the then (GTMO Task Force, ITOS1) wrote an EC (quite long) explaining the Bureau way of Interrogation vs. DoDs methodology. Our formal guidance has always been that all personnel conduct themselves in interviews in the manner that they would in the field. See along with FBI advised that the LEA (Law Enforcement Agencies) at GTMO were not in the practice of the using SERE techniques and were of the opinion results obtained from these interrogations were suspect at best. BAU explained to DoD. FBI has been successful for many years obtaining confessions via non-confrontational interviewing techniques.

We spoke to FBI OGC with our concerns, I also brought these matters to the attention of DOJ during detainee meetings with Laura Parsky and Dave Nahmias. DOJ express their concerns to DoD OGC.

ьс -1. , what a copy of all the information regarding the BAU LHM. I believe she has provided that to ту Наглядов.

I may have more specific information in my desk at HQ. I will search what I have when I return (5/17).

From: HARRINGTON, T J. (Div13) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 4:33 AM
To: BATTLE, FRANKIE (Div13) (FBI); (Div13) (FBI)
Subject: FW: pls confirm

## SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED NON-RECORD

Please review our control files, did we produce anything on paper???

—Original Message—
From: Caproni, Valerie E. (DM09) (FBI)
Sent: Sunday, May 09, 2004 2:31 PM
Sent: Sunday, May 09, 2004 (FBI) WARDINGTON, T.J. (Div13) (FBI)

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#### Chronology

### Relating to the Nomination of Alice Fisher for Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division

(as of September 2006)

Feb. 4, 2005:	First Levin-Lieberman request (to FBI Director Robert Mueller) for an unredacted copy of the May 10, 2004 FBI email referring to weekly DOJ-FBI meetings as which DoD interrogation techniques were discussed.
Feb. 7, 2005:	DOJ response denies the Levin-Lieberman request for unredacted copy of May 10, 2004 FBI email.
Feb. 10, 2005:	Second Levin-Lieberman request (to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales) for an unredacted copy of the e-mail.
Mar. 10, 2005:	DOJ response provides a revised version of the May 10, 2004 FBI document with fewer redactions. New version includes a reference to Alice Fisher as one of the senior officials attending meetings where FBI agents expressed concerns about interrogation techniques at Guantanamo Bay.
April 4, 2005	Alice Fisher nominated for Assistant Attorney General of DOJ Criminal Division.
April 6, 2005	DOJ letter to Senator Levin supplementing the February 10, 2005 Levin/Lieberman letter, including third version of May 10, 2004 document with additional text restored. Name of email's author remains redacted.
May 2, 2005	Levin letter to Attorney General Gonzales requesting again that DOJ provide the names of the author of the email and other FBI personnel still redacted from the May 10, 2004 document and for an opportunity to interview FBI and DOJ personnel named in that document.

May 12, 2005 Judiciary Committee holds hearing on Fisher nomination.

May 2005 In response to written questions from Judiciary Committee member Senator Richard Durbin, Fisher states she did "recall general discussions about interrogations at Guantanamo Bay" but did "not recall that interrogation techniques were discussed" at weekly meetings between DOJ and FBI. She states she does "recall being aware of FBI concerns about interviews" but "cannot recall the content of specific meetings about detainee interrogation at Guantanamo Bay."

June 7, 2005

In response to second set of written questions from Senators

Durbin and Kennedy, Fisher says she does "not recall FBI

personnel or anyone else expressing to me allegations about
mistreatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay." She states that
she "cannot reconcile my recollection with statements
contained in the (May 10, 2004) email...."

June 14, 2005 Senators Durbin, Kennedy, and Levin interview Alice Fisher. Fisher says she does not recall FBI expressing concerns about interrogation techniques at Guantanamo Bay, other than concerns about their effectiveness.

June 16, 2005 Judiciary Committee reports Fisher nomination. Nomination placed on the Senate Executive Calendar.

June 29, 2005 Levin letter to Attorney General Gonzales asking for a reply to his May 2, 2005 letter and renewing requests for information and interviews of David Nahmias, Laura Parsky, Bruce Swartz, and other officials named in the May 10, 2004 email.

July 26, 2005 DOJ Letter to Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter stating that the author of the May 10, 2004 FBI email now says that he "did not have conversations with Ms. Fisher nor does he recall conversations in Ms Fisher's presence about the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay."

July 29, 2005	Letter from Attorney General Gonzales to Minority Leader Harry Reid stating that the steps the Department has taken in response to Senators' concerns "are sufficient for the Senate to make an informed decision" about the Fisher nomination.
August 19, 2005	Levin letter to DOJ Inspector General Glenn Fine inquiring about issues to be review by the on-going IG investigation into FBI allegations of detainee mistreatment by DOD personnel at Guantanamo Bay. Among issues Senator Levin recommends be reviewed is "the extent to which Ms. Fisher was aware of FBI concerns about detainee interrogations and efforts to convey these concerns to DOD and others."
August 31, 2005	Alice Fisher receives recess appointment from President Bush to become Assistant Attorney General of DOJ Criminal Division.
Sept. 16, 2005	DOJ IG Fine letter to Levin indicating that ongoing review of FBI personnel's allegations regarding detainee abuse at Guantanamo will include issues relating to "the role of Alice Fisher, Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, and other Department officials regarding detainee interrogation techniques."
Sept. 19, 2005	Alice Fisher is re-nominated for Assistant Attorney General of DOJ Criminal Division.
Sept. 29, 2005	Minority Leader Reid letter to Attorney General Gonzales requesting that DOJ provide interested Senators with the opportunity to interview relevant FBI and DOJ personnel.
Dec. 15, 2005	At meeting with Attorney General Gonzales and White House Counsel Harriet Miers, Senator Levin requests meeting with FBI agent who authored the May 2004 email without DOJ representative present, but offers compromise of having DOJ IG representative sit in on the meeting.

Senator Specter letter to Attorney General Gonzales requesting

July 25, 2006

to set up an interview between Senator Levin and the FBI Agent. Levin letter to Attorney General Gonzales requesting to meet July 25, 2006 with the FBI Agent with Senator Specter, and an IG representative present, or alternatively, a representative from the FBI's Office of General Counsel (OGC). DOJ letter to Levin agreeing to the request to make FBI Agent July 26, 2006 available to be interviewed with a representative from the FBI OGC present, but asserting that questions must be limited to those related to "the agent's factual knowledge of communications to Ms. Fisher about the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay." Levin letter to DOJ clarifies that Senator Levin intends to ask July 26, 2006 the FBI agent "any question which I consider relevant to the nomination of Alice Fisher." July 26, 2006 Senators Levin and Specter meet with the FBI Agent, as well as FBI General Counsel Valerie Caproni. FBI Agent recalls only one FBI-DOJ meeting where Alice Fisher was present but states he had regular conversations with two Criminal Division officials, David Nahmias and Bruce Swartz, regarding DoD interrogation techniques. The FBI Agent told Mr. Nahmias that the DoD interrogation of one detainee was "completely inappropriate." August 1, 2006 Levin letter to Attorney General Gonzales again requesting to interview David Nahmias and Bruce Swartz. August 30, 2006 DOJ Letter to Levin requesting a vote on Ms. Fisher's nomination. The letter does not address Senator Levin's request for interviews of David Nahmias and Bruce Swartz. Sept. 12, 2006 Levin letter to Attorney General Gonzales reiterating request to

interview David Nahmias and Bruce Swartz, but proposing in

the alternative that they provide answers to questions included with the letter.

